A multiple antenna Gaussian wiretap channel with a multiantenna cooperative jammer (CJ) is considered and the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.), with N antennas at the sender, receiver, and eavesdropper, is derived for all possible values of the number of antennas at the cooperative jammer, K. In particular, the upper and lower bounds for the s.d.o.f. are provided for different ranges of K and shown to coincide. Gaussian signaling both for transmission and jamming is shown to be sufficient to achieve the s.d.o.f. of the channel, when the s.d.o.f. is integer-valued. By contrast, when the channel has a non-integer s.d.o.f., structured signaling and joint signal space and signal scale alignment are employed to achieve the s.d.o.f. 978-1-4799-5999-0/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic secrecy [1] guarantees secure communication in the presence of an eavesdropper. Information theoretic secrecy of multiterminal and multiantenna channels has been studied extensively, e.g., [2] - [9] . In particular, the Gaussian wiretap channel (WTC) with a cooperative jammer (CJ) was studied in [2] - [8] . A CJ can improve the secrecy rate and even the prelog factor of the secrecy rate, i.e., the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) [5] . Relying on cooperative jamming and structured signaling, [6] , [7] identified the s.d.o.f. for several single-antenna WTC models. In this paper, we extend [6] to a multiantenna secure communication scenario.
We focus on a multiantenna Gaussian WTC with a Kantenna CJ and N antennas at each of the transmitter, receiver, and wiretapper. For 0 ≤ K ≤ 2N , we characterize the s.d.o.f. arriving at the s.d.o.f. of N at K = 2N , concluding that increasing K over 2N cannot improve the s.d.o.f. We derive an upper bound on the s.d.o.f. which allows for cooperation between the transmitter and CJ, and show that this bound is tight for 0 ≤ K ≤ N 2 . Next, for N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we derive another upper bound which incorporates both the secrecy and reliability constraints. We use this upper bound for K = N to upper bound the s.d.o.f. for all N 2 < K < N . We show that increasing K from N 2 to N does not increase the s.d.o.f. Next, we divide 0 ≤ K ≤ 2N into five different ranges and propose an achievable scheme which meets with the derived upper bound for each range. Whenever the s.d.o.f. is integervalued, we show that Gaussian signaling at the transmitter and the CJ is sufficient to achieve the s.d.o.f. of the channel. By contrast, when the s.d.o.f. is not an integer, structured signaling along with joint signal space and signal scale alignment are This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 09-64362, 13-19338 and CNS 13-14719. needed. When K is larger than N , a linear precoder is utilized at the CJ so that some jamming signals are transmitted over directions invisible to the legitimate receiver.
Overall, this study settles the secrecy capacity of the N × N × N MIMO wiretap channel in the high SNR, when a multiantenna CJ is available as a helper. As compared to the single antenna counterpart that uses real interference alignment with one dimensional lattices, here we need to use a variety of spatial and signal scale alignment techniques in concert to coordinate multiple antenna transmissions.
Notation: For matrix A, ||A|| denotes its induced norm. For vector V, V j i = [V i · · · V j ] T , where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, and ||V|| denotes Euclidean norm. 0 m×n denotes an m × n matrix of zeros. The set of integers {−Q, · · · , Q} is denoted by (−Q, Q) Z . Z[j] denotes the set of complex integers.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
We consider a multiantenna Gaussian WTC composed of a transmitter, a receiver, an eavesdropper each with N antennas, and a K-antenna CJ, see Fig.1 . The received signals at the receiver and eavesdropper at the nth channel use are given by
where X t (n), X c (n) are the transmitted signals from the transmitter and CJ, respectively. H t , G t ∈ C N ×N are the transmitter's channel matrices to the legitimate receiver and to the eavesdropper, and H c , G c ∈ C N ×K are the channel matrices from the CJ to the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. The channel gains are static, and complex-valued. Z r (n) and Z e (n) denote the complex Gaussian noise at the nth channel use, i.e., Z r (n), Z e (n) ∼ CN (0, I N ), are independent from one another and both are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across 1 n. The power constraints at the transmitter and CJ are E X H t X t , E X H c X c ≤ P . Let X n t = [X t (1) · · · X t (n)]. X n c , Y n r , Y n e , Z n r , Z n e are defined similarly. The transmitter intends to send a secret message W ∈ W to the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. W is mapped into the transmitted signal X n t ∈ X n t by using a stochastic encoder f : W → X n t at the transmitter. The receiver forms an estimate of W , denoted bŷ W . Secrecy rate R s is achievable if for any > 0, there exists a channel code, 2 nRs , n , such that
The achievable s.d.o.f. for a given secrecy rate, R s , is
The CJ transmits X n c ∈ X n c . The jamming signal X n c is not meant to convey a message. There is no common randomness between the transmitter and the CJ.
III. MAIN RESULT Theorem 1 The s.d.o.f. of the multiantenna Gaussian WTC with a K-antenna CJ and N antennas at each of its nodes is to N . In Sections IV and V, we provide the converse and achievability proofs for Theorem 1.
IV. CONVERSE
We allow for cooperation between the transmitter and CJ, obtain, in effect a multiantenna Gaussian WTC with N + Kantenna transmitter, N -antenna receiver, and N -antenna eavesdropper. The secrecy rate of this channel is bounded as [9] 
whereH,Ḡ ∈ C N ×N +K are the channel matrices from the combined transmitter to the receiver and eavesdropper, andḠ is the projection matrix onto N (Ḡ). We also have [9] HḠ
where Ψ is a unitary matrix and Ω is a non-singular matrix. By substituting (7) in (6), it can be easily shown that
1 Throughout the paper, we omit index n whenever possible.
The secrecy rate for the original channel, R s , is upper bounded byR s . Using (4), the s.d.o.f., D s , is upper bounded by K.
Here, we extend the converse proof in [6] to the multiantenna channel. Let φ i , i = 1, · · · , 6, denote constants that do not depend on the power P . R s can be upper bounded as
(9) follows from (3) and Fano's inequality;
Using infinite divisibility of Gaussian distribution, a stochastically equivalent form of Z e is Z e = G tZt + Z e .Z e ∼ CN (0,
Substituting (18) in (16) gives us
In order to reliably transmit the message W , we must have
where (21) follows similar to (17), and (22) follows since for correlated X and Y,
Combining (19) and (24), we get
Using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the power constraints, we can show that the variance of Y r k (i) is bounded as
, and h r t k , h r c k are the kth row vectors of H t and H c . Thus, h(Y r k (i)) ≤ log 2πe(1 + h 2 P ). Similarly, we can show that h(X c k (i)) ≤ log 2πe(β 2 + P ). Thus, C. Obtaining the upper bound for all K
We use the upper bound obtained in Section IV-A for 0 ≤ K ≤ N 2 , and the upper bound obtained in Section IV-B for N ≤ K ≤ 2N . By comparing the two, it is evident that the upper bound from Section IV-A is greater than N 2 for N 2 < K ≤ N . Since we know, from Section IV-B, that at K = N , the upper bound is N 2 , we can use N 2 as the upper bound for N 2 < K ≤ N . Combining these statements, we get (5). Next, we shall see the achievability of (5).
V. ACHIEVABLE SCHEMES
We divide the range 0 ≤ K ≤ 2N into five cases and propose an achievable scheme for each case. For all the achievable schemes, we have the n-letter signals, X n t and X n c , as i.i.d. sequences. Since X n c is independent from X n t , we have in effect a memoryless WTC, and the following secrecy rate is achievable by stochastic encoding [1] :
A. Case 1:
The transmitter sends K independent Gaussian information streams and the CJ sends K independent Gaussian jamming streams. Since 2K ≤ N , the legitimate receiver can decode all the information and jamming streams at high SNR. The transmitter chooses a precoder, P t , which aligns its information streams over the jamming streams at the eavesdropper. The signals transmitted by the transmitter and the CJ are
where U t , V c ∼ CN (0,P I K ). U t and V c are the information and jamming streams, respectively. P t = G −1 t G c = [p t1 · · · p t K ] , and J c = I K .P = 1 α P , where α = max{K, K i=1 ||p ti || 2 } to satisfy the power constraints. The received signals are expressed as
We lower bound (27) as follows. First, H t G −1 t G c H c is almost surely (a.s.) full column-rank. Thus,
Next, we upper bound the term I(X t ; Y e ) as follows:
By substituting (31) and (32) in (27), we have 
). Using the same analysis as in the previous case, the achievable s.d.o.f. is N 2 for any N 2 < K ≤ N , where N is even.
C. Case 3: N 2 < K ≤ N and N is odd For this case, we utilize structured signaling both at the transmitter and the CJ. In particular, we propose to use joint signal space alignment and the complex field equivalent of real interference alignment [10] , [11] . The transmitter and CJ send N +1 2 streams each. The transmitter aligns its information streams over the jamming at the eavesdropper. The legitimate receiver projects its received signal over a direction orthogonal to all but one information and one jamming streams, decodes these two streams from the projection, and subtracts their effect from its received signal, leaving N − 1 spatial dimensions for the other streams. For notational simplicity, let d = N +1 2 . The transmitted signals are given by (28) 
The values for a and the integer Q are chosen as
where > 0 can be arbitrarily small, and ν, γ are constants. LetG c = G c J c . The received signal at the eavesdropper is
We upper bound I(X t ; Y e ) as follows:
where (38) follows since the mappings U t + V c →G c (U t + V c ), V c →G c V c are invertible, since the entries ofG c are rationally independent 2 . Next, we derive a lower bound for I(X t ; Y r ). The received signal at the legitimate receiver is
where
Let a i and h ci be the ith column vectors of A andH c , respectively. The legitimate receiver chooses b ∈ C N such that b ⊥ span {a 2 , · · · , a d , h c2 , · · · , h c d } and multiplies its received signal by the decoding matrix, [10] . The legitimate receiver employs a hard decision decoder which maps Y r1 ∈ Y r1 to the nearest point in the constellation
Then, the legitimate receiver passes the output of the hard decision decoder through the bijective map f 1 U 1 + f 2 V 1 → (U 1 , V 1 ) to decode both U 1 , V 1 , and subtracts their effect from Y N r2 to obtain
B = ã 2 · · ·ã dhc2 · · ·h c d ∈ C N −1×N −1 is a.s. full rank due to the random generation assumption on the channel gains. Finally, by zero forcing, the receiver obtains U d t2 fromȲ r . The term I(X t ; Y r ) is lower bounded as follows:
where (45) follows since U t → X t → Y r → Y r forms a Markov chain. The term I(U 1 ; Y r1 ) can be bounded as
where P e1 = Pr{Û 1 = U 1 }, and (48) follows from Fano's 2 A set of complex numbers {c 1 , · · · , c L } are rationally independent if there is no set of rational numbers {r 1 , · · · , r L }, rather than the all zeros set, such that L i=1 r i c i = 0 [10] .
inequality. Since the mapping (U 1 , V 1 ) → f 1 U 1 + f 2 V 1 is invertible, the only source for error is the Gaussian noise Z .
where |Z | ∼ Rayleigh( ||b|| √ 2 ) and d min is the minimum distance between points in the constellation R 1 , which can be lower bounded using the following lemma [10] , [11] .
Lemma 1 For almost all z ∈ C n and for all > 0,
holds for all q ∈ Z n , p ∈ Z except for finitely many of them.
Thus, for almost all channel gains, d min is
Substituting (54) in (51) gives P e1 ≤ exp(−µP ), where µ = γ 2 |f1| 2 2 − 4||b|| 2 . Using (34) and (49), we have
Next, we lower bound the term
Thus, we have
Using the union bound, we have
where µ = γ 2 8σ 2 max , σ max = max i σ i , and = 3 2+ . Thus,
Thus, substituting (55) and (62) in (46) gives us
and using (4), (27), (39), and (63) results in D s ≥ 1− 2+ N . Since > 0 is arbitrarily small, we can achieve s.d.o.f. of N 2 .
D. Case 4: N < K ≤ 2N and K is even
The achievable scheme for this case involves transmitting K 2 Gaussian information and K 2 Gaussian jamming streams. The CJ sends K−N out of its K 2 streams over the null space of H c , N (H c ), leaving only N − K 2 streams visible to the legitimate receiver. At high SNR, the legitimate receiver can decode the K 2 information and the N − K 2 jamming streams. For notational simplicity, let g = N − K 2 . The transmitted signals are given by (28), with
),P = 1 α P , and α is chosen to satisfy the power constraints.
Let
The received signals are given by
whereB = AJ I AJ n H c J I ∈ C N ×N can be written as
By extending the proof in the Appendix in [8] , we can show thatB is a.s. full rank. Thus, we have I(X t ; Y r ) = K 2 log P + o(log P ). Similar to (32), we have
E. Case 5: N < K ≤ 2N and K is odd
The transmitter sends K+1 2 structured information and the CJ sends K+1 2 structured jamming streams. The CJ sends K − N out of its streams over N (H c ). The legitimate receiver projects its received signal over a direction orthogonal to all but one information and one jamming streams, decodes these two streams from the projection, and subtracts their effect from its received signal to decode the other information streams. Let m = K+1 2 and l = N − K−1 2 . The transmitted signals are given by (28), with P t = G −1 t G c J c , J c = [J I J n ], J I = [I l 0 l×K−l ] T , J n is defined as in the previous subsection, and U t , V c ∈ Z m [j], a, Q are defined as in Section V-C. Similar to going from (36) to (39), we have I(X t ; Y e ) ≤ K.
The received signal at the legitimate receiver is given by
where A = H t G −1 t G c J c ,H c = H c J I . The receiver chooses b ⊥ span {a 2 , · · · , a m , h c2 , · · · , h c l } and multiplies its received signal by D in (41) to obtain Y r = [ Y r1 ( Y N r2 ) T ] T . Using similar analysis as in Section V-C, we have
where > 0 is arbitrarily small.Ȳ r , in (70), is given bȳ
where B = [ã 2 · · ·ã mhc2 · · ·h c l ]. Using the argument in Section V-D, B is a.s. full rank. Define Y r = B −1Ȳ r . Thus,
Thus, D s ≥ 1− 2+ K. Since is arbitrarily small, the s.d.o.f. of K 2 is achievable, which completes the proof for Theorem 1. VI. CONCLUSION We have characterized the s.d.o.f. for the multiantenna Gaussian wiretap channel with a K-antenna cooperative jammer (CJ) and N antennas at each of its nodes for all possible values of K. We have shown that when the s.d.o.f. of the channel is integer-valued, the s.d.o.f. can be achieved by a scheme which involves linear precoding, Gaussian signaling both for transmission and jamming, and linear receiver processing. In contrast, we have proved that, when the s.d.o.f. is non-integer, a scheme which employs structured signaling along with joint signal space and signal scale alignment achieves the s.d.o.f. of the channel. The converse was proved by allowing for cooperation between the transmitter and CJ for a certain range of K, and by incorporating both the secrecy and reliability constraints, for the other values of K. Although we identified its prelog factor, the secrecy capacity of this model remains open and deserves further attention.
